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Statement of the Issues

Amicus Curiae incorporates the statement of "Issue,

~

Preservation and Standards of Review" set forth in Appellant's
Opening Brief.

Determinative Provisions
The following determinative provisions of Utah's Forfeiture
and Disposition of Property Act, as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 24-

~

1-101, et. seq., are attached verbatim as Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-103
Utah Code Ann. § 24-2-102
Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-103
Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-108
Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-114
Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-116
Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-117

Statement of Case and Facts

Amicus Curiae incorporates the "Statement of the Case" set
forth in Appellant's Opening Brief and Addenda.

~
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Summary of Argument

This is a case of first impression. It sits at the jurisdictional
intersection of federal and state forfeiture laws. The parties have
correctly noted that the first court to exercise in rem jurisdiction in a
forfeiture case does so to the exclusion of all other courts. Thus, the
pivotal issue is determining when a court obtains in rem jurisdiction
over asset forfeitures under Utah's Forfeiture and Disputation of
Property Act. Appellant Savely argues that seizure by a state· agent
under color of state law is sufficient to imbue state courts with
jurisdiction; appellees Utah Highway Patrol and Utah Department of
Public Safety (hereafter "UHP") contended below that jurisdiction
falls to the first court where a filing involving the asset is made.
Although perhaps not for the exact reason Appellant contends,
reading the statute in light of its historical and legal context indicates
that Appellant reached the correct conclusion.
The relevant passages of Utah's Forfeiture and Disputation of
Property Act derive from a 2000 citizen initiative known as "Initiative
B." Initiative B was a response to the explosive rise in the use of civil
asset forfeiture during the 1980s and 1990s as part of the War on
Drugs. Under reformed federal laws designed to empower law
enforcement against drug dealers, federal agencies could keep 100%
of the proceeds of everything they seized. This gave them a direct
financial incentive to seize property; in the first six years of these
new laws federal asset forfeitures increased over 2000%, and they

2
~
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have increased ever sense. Additionally, local law enforcement
agencies could participate in "equitable sharing," giving them a
similar financial motive to seize assets. Initiative B was intended to
end "policing for profit" and give Utahns refuge from abuses of both
state and federal civil asset forfeiture.
By examining the statute's historical context and placing the
actual language of the statute in its legal context, the clear meaning
of the statute becomes apparent. Among its provisions, the statute
says that, "[p]roperty held for forfeiture is considered to be in the
custody of the district court." Courts in the early 2000s would have
understood this phrase as imbuing state courts with in rem
jurisdiction at the moment a state agent seizes property under the
color of state law. This interpretation of the statute is the only one

~

that is textually and historically faithful.

Amicus curiae further asks the Court to consider the real-world
implications of its ruling. Financial incentives are powerful and
Utah's law was intended to minimize the distorting and corrupting
effects of "policing for profit" by local law enforcement. Upholding
the court below would allow state agencies to easily circumvent the
restrictions imposed upon them by state forfeiture law. The question
is simply what rules will property owners in Utah live under:
increased protections under state law or lower standards under
federal law. This Court should adopt a textually and contextually
faithful reading of Utah's Forfeiture and Disposition of Property Act:

3
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when a state agent seizes assets under color of state law, state courts
automatically acquire in rem jurisdiction over the forfeiture.
Argument

Modern civil forfeiture laws have "led to egregious and wellchronicled abuses." Leonard v. Texas, 580 U.S._, 137 S. Ct. 847,
848 (2017) (Thomas, J., respecting denial of certiorari). When
Initiative B was passed in 2000, Utahns sought to restrain such
abuses. Utah's Forfeiture and Disputation of Property Act did so by
shifting the bulk of forfeitures from federal courts into state courts
~

and giving property owners additional protections in the state
system. It was a prescient move putting Utah ahead of a coming wave
of public opposition against a practice that allows police to seize
property with limited judicial oversight and retain it for their own
use. This case is about the continued viability of Utah's reforms.
The case presents an issue of first impression: when do state
courts obtain in rem jurisdiction over assets under Utah's Forfeiture
and Disputation of Property Act? It is a simple legal question with
far-reaching consequences.
Appellant Savely argues that seizure by a state agent under
color of state law is sufficient to imbue state courts with jurisdiction.
Opening Brief of Appellant, at 6. While this conclusion is correct and

cites multiple statutory provisions, this argument fails to address
statutory language which could plausibly be read as requiring a court
action before jurisdiction is obtained. See Utah Code Ann. § 24-1-

4
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103(1) ("A state district court has jurisdiction over any action filed in
accordance with this title ... "). The argument also fails to consider
additional language in the statute that directly justifies Appellant's
position.
Appellee Utah Highway Patrol, by contrast, argued below that
neither seizure by a state agent nor issuance of notice of forfeiture
were sufficient to place in rem jurisdiction with the state courts:
"something" more like a search warrant, court order, or petition
would have to actually be filed in or by the court. Transcript of Oral

Arguments on Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside, 16:17-21 ("I should
clarify, it should be either the court does something as in a search
warrant or some sort of order or there's something actually initiated
in the court such as filing the petition, you know, filing a petition for

~

forfeiture."); see also id. at 15:6-15 ("The problem with the intent to
seize form is that in itself doesn't actually initiate the actual forfeiture
proceeding .... "). This argument is wrong because it manufactures a
conflict with federal law where none exists and, more importantly, it
ignores statutory provisions that govern when in rem jurisdiction falls
to the state courts. Through this argument, UHP obtained an
outcome in the lower court that flies in the face of the stated
purposes of Utah's forfeiture laws.
Because the statute does not contain a single provision that
neatly answers the question presented, this Court is tasked with
determining the effect of the statutory language that does exist.

5
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Amicus curiae contends that in this case the only way to do so is to
consider the entire language of the statute in light of the historical
and legal context which led to the adoption of Utah's Forfeiture and
Disputation of Property Act as well as the potential consequences of
the Court's ruling. This brief discusses that history and context,
identifies the purposes of Initiative B, discusses the statutory
language used and how that language has been interpreted by other
courts, and discusses the real-world consequences of the choice
before the Court.
1. A Brief History of Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture: from

Inauspicious Maritime Origins to a Juggernaut in the War
on Drugs.

The conceptual basis for civil asset forfeiture is the legal fiction
that property can be guilty of a crime. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson

Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 684 (1974) ("The vessel was
'treated as the offender,' without regard to the owner's conduct, 'as
the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or
insuring an indemnity to the injured party."' (quoting United States v.

Brig Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 233 (1844))). The Supreme Court has
justified its constitutional treatment of civil forfeiture largely by
reference to a historical practice existing at the time of the founding.

Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848 (citations omitted). English maritime law
of the era provided for forfeiture of objects used in violation of
customs and revenue laws. Id. (citations omitted). This was done
without regard to the guilt or innocence of the property owners. Id.
6
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at 849; Dick Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit 10 (2nd Ed. 2015)
(citation omitted). 1
The practice continued in the United States, when the First
Congress adopted similar laws "subjecting ships and cargos involved
in customs offenses to forfeiture." Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848.
Although the laws were upheld by early cases, forfeiture was limited
to the maritime context: admiralty, customs, and piracy. Carpenter et
al., Policing for Profit 10 (citation omitted); see also Leonard, 137 S.
Ct. at 849. In other words, the practice was limited to circumstances
where in personam proceedings were exceedingly difficult or
impossible because property owners were outside the jurisdiction of
the United States. Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit 10 (citation
omitted). As such, the statutes permitted in rem proceedings, which
often proceeded civilly instead of criminally. Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at
849 (citations omitted).
For over 150 years, the practice remained comparatively

Ctiv

limited. Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit 10 (citation omitted).
While the nineteenth century saw some expansion of forfeiture
during the Civil War, and the early twentieth century saw a brief
expansion during Prohibition, the modern practice of civil asset
forfeiture is a creature of the War on Drugs. See Annemarie Bridy,

Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on
Piracy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. 683, 694-95 (2014) ("Civil forfeiture in the
1

Available at http://ij.org/report/policing-for-profit/ (last visited
Oct. 9, 2017).
7
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United States dates from colonial times, but it was seldom called
upon until its meteoric rise in the enforcement of federal drug laws
beginning in the 1980s." (citations omitted)).
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act, which authorized the government to
seize drugs and property used to manufacture, store, and transport
drugs. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 881(a); see Eric Moores, Note, Reforming
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 777, 780-82
(2009) (giving a brief history of civil asset forfeiture). This was
followed by legislation broadening forfeiture laws to include, in
1978, the proceeds of drug transactions, and in 1984, real property.

See Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633,
92 Stat. 3768 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
21 U.S.C.); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (authorizing forfeiture of real
property used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate a
federal drug felony); Moores, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. at 781-82. In all, since
the beginning of the War on Drugs, forfeiture laws have been applied
~

to a wide range of situations: more than 400 federal statutes,
covering a lengthy list of different crimes, now enable the use of
forfeiture against one's property. Libertas Institute, Civil Asset
Forfeiture: The Legalization of Theft at 2; 2 John R. Emshwiller and
Gary Fields, Federal Asset Seizures Rise, Netting Innocent with

2

Available at http://libertasutah.org/policy-

papers/civil_asset_forfeiture. pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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Guilty, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 22, 2011. 3
Furthermore, in 1984 Congress passed the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act, which created the Department of Justice's Assets
Forfeiture Fund for depositing forfeiture proceeds for federal agency
~

use. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 310, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). With this fund,
federal law enforcement agencies could divvy up seized assets and
cash for their own use. Many states followed the federal
government's lead by passing similar laws of their own. Carpenter et
al., Policing for Profit 10. And even where state law did not authorize
forfeiture, the equitable sharing provisions of the federal law allowed
state agencies to likewise obtain a direct financial stake in the
forfeiture process. See id. at 25-30 (explaining how state agencies
employ equitable sharing to sidestep state law and use federal
forfeiture to obtain the proceeds of a forfeiture); see also U.S.
Department of Justice, Guide to Equitable Sharing for State and Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, April 2009. 4
With these changes not only could law enforcement seize the
suspected proceeds of crime and property purchased with the
proceeds of crime, but for the first time they obtained direct financial
benefit from forfeitures. This economic incentive for agencies to seize
assets has come to be known as "policing for profit." See Jefferson E.
3

Available at
https://www.wsj.com/ articles/SB 100014240531119034809045 7651
2253265073870 (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
4 Available at https://www.justice.gov/criminalafmls/file/794696/download (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
9
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Holcomb et al., Civil asset forfeiture, equitable sharing, and policing for
~

profit in the United States, 39 Journal of Criminal Justice 273, 275
(2011) ("Perhaps the most significant criticism of asset forfeiture has
focused on the purported financial incentives for law enforcement
agencies to 'police for profit,,, (citations omitted)). Given that
economic theory tells us that economic incentives are realized, it is
no wonder that law enforcement quickly scaled up the use of civil
asset forfeiture. See Butler, Drahozal & Shepherd, Economic Analysis
for Lawyers 3 (3d ed. 2014) ("the crucial point of economics is that
incentives matter"); id. at 5 ("Economic actors are assumed to
maximize their well-being subject to constraints."); see also Donald J.
Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs:
Lessons from Economics and History, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 79 (1996)
("This Article uses economic analysis to show how civil forfeiture
creates perverse incentives for law enforcement officials and
encourages abuses."); Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit 10 ("In
allowing agencies to keep some or all of what they forfeit, civil

~

forfeiture laws permit, if not encourage, law enforcement to police
for profit. And agencies have responded with zeal.")
"In 1985, its first year, the fund ingested $27 million in assets
seized under federal law. By 1991, annual deposits had grown to
$644 million-an increase of over 2,000%." Bridy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. at
695. And by 2014, deposits had increased over 4000% to $4.5
billion. Carpenter et al., Policing for Profit 10 (equivalent to "2,107
10
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percent in inflation-adjusted dollars").
As the money accumulated into the 1990s, criticism of these

new forfeiture powers mounted. See, e.g., Tamara Piety, Scorched

Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste
to Due Process, 45 U. Miami. L. Rev. 911, 921 (1991) (calling federal
forfeiture a "legal juggernaut, crushing every due process claim
thrown in its path"); John Enders, Forfeiture Law Casts a Shadow on

Presumption of Innocence: Legal system: Government uses the statute to
seize money and property believed to be linked to narcotics trafficking.
But critics say it short-circuits the Constitution., L.A. Times, Apr. 18,
1993. 5 Statistics began showing that "equitable sharing led to overenforcement in the area of drug crime and under-enforcement in
other areas." Bridy, 46 Ariz. St. L.J. at 696-97 (citations omitted).
Both academic literature and case law are now replete with examples
of overreaching and abuse. Id. at 700-03 (discussing several such
cases).
Overreaching and abuse led to a concerted reform effort. As a
result, Congress modestly reformed federal asset forfeiture law
through the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000. Carpenter et
al., Policing for Profit 2, 10 (citation omitted). It was in this context
that Utah's citizens passed Initiative B, which is discussed below.
The federal reforms, however, did little to stop the forfeiture
juggernaut. As noted above, federal forfeiture is bringing in more
5

Available at http://articles.latimes.com/1993-04-18/local/me24209_l_forfeiture-law (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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money than ever. But while it is a popular tool for law enforcement,
it is increasingly unpopular with nearly everyone else. Indeed, that
opposition has achieved rare bipartisan consensus, with both the
Democratic and Republican platforms in 2016 backing reformation
and restriction of forfeiture laws. Republican Platform 2016, pg 15
(Civil asset forfeiture "has become a tool for unscrupulous law
enforcement officials, acting without due process, to profit by
destroying the livelihood of innocent individuals, many of whom
never recover the lawful assets taken from them ... We call on
~

Congress and state legislatures to enact reforms to protect lawabiding citizens against abusive asset forfeiture tactics."); 6 2016
Democratic Party Platform, pg 14 ("And we will reform the civil asset
forfeiture system to protect people and remove perverse incentives
for law enforcement to 'police for a profit."'). 7
Since 2014, twenty-five states plus Washington, D.C., have
followed Utah's early efforts and reformed their own forfeiture laws.
Institute for Justice, Civil Forfeiture Reforms on the State Level. 8 Three
states have ended the practice outright. Id. But perhaps the most
important indicator of forfeiture's precarious legal position is that a
6

Available at https://prod-static-ngoppbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/DRAFT_ 12_FINAL%Sb 1%
Sd-ben_1468872234.pdf (last visited Oct 3, 2017)
7
Available at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/2016
_DNC_Platform.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
8
Available at http://ij.org/activism/legislation/civil-forfeiturelegislative-highlights/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gv

sitting Supreme Court justice is openly questioning whether the
modern incarnation of federal forfeiture is compatible with
constitutional norms: Justice Thomas recently issued a searing
indictment of the federal civil asset forfeiture regime and called on
~

the judiciary to reconsider its flawed approach. See Leonard, 137 S.
Ct. at 847-850. That call continued a nearly quarter-century long
practice of voicing concern regarding civil forfeiture's modern

Gv

incarnation. See Nick Sibilla, Justice Thomas' Long History of
Criticizing Asset Forfeiture, The Federalist Society Blog. 9
Utah's Initiative B, and the rest of Utah's forfeiture laws, must
be read in light of the history of asset forfeiture. That history has led
to a wave of reform across the nation and growing concern by the
judiciary. It is relevant to the intent and meaning of the law as well
as the consequences Utahns face if the state system is not able to give
them greater protections than the federal system, as was intended by
Initiative B and subsequent amendments.
2. Utah's Statutory Reforms were Intended to Stop the
Federal Forfeiture Juggernaut.
2.1

Initiative B was Designed to Divert Civil
Forfeitures into a State System with Greater
Protections for Property Owners

Initiative B was intended to play Utah's Dr. Jekyll to the federal
Mr. Hyde version of forfeiture. The ballot measure asked the
following question:

9

Available at http://www.fed-soc.org/blog/detail/justice-thomaslong-history-of-criticizing-asset-forfeiture (last visited Oct. 9, 2017)
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Shall a law be amended to:
(1)

~

(2)
(3)
(4)

(5)

forbid forfeiture (seizure and sale) of
property involved in crime where an
innocent owner neither knew of nor
consented to the crime;
create uniform procedures to protect
property owners where forfeiture is sought
by the government;
require government to prove property is
subject to forfeiture, and to reimburse
owners for damage to property in custody;
require distribution of forfeiture proceeds,
after deductions for court costs and victim
losses, to schools instead of counties or the
state;
clarify valuation methods for forfeited
property, and require tracking and
reporting of all money from its sale?

Id. at 4 7. Sixty-nine percent of Utahns answered yes. Office of Lt.
Gov., Election Results - 2000 General Election; 10 see also Ballot
Questions, Deseret News, Nov. 8, 2000. 11

As a citizen's initiative, Initiative B's legislative history and
intent are not contained in committee discussions and floor debates.
Rather, the Initiative's text, the official ballot materials, and local
news articles published near in time to the election establish the
electorate's understanding of and purposes in approving Initiative B.
See Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election November 7,
2000, [hereafter Utah Voter Guide]. 12 These sources make clear that
10

Available at

https ://elections. utah.gov/Media/Default/Documents/Election_Resu
lts/General/2000Gen.pdf (last visited Oct. 9 2017).
11
Available at https://www.deseretnews.com/article/792138/Ballotquestions.html (last visited Oct 9, 2017).
12

Available at

https ://elections. utah.gov/Media/Default/Historical%20VIPs/2000%
20VIP.compressed.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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Initiative B was intend to (a) protect property owners, especially
innocent owners, under a state system with heightened due process;
(b) remove incentives to police for profit; and (c) severely limit the
ability of state agencies to opt-out of state forfeiture requirements
through participation in federal equitable sharing programs.
Voters intended Initiative B to stop forfeiture abuse, especially
vis-a-vis innocent owners. Voters were told the law would "forbid
forfeiture (seizure and sale) of property involved in crime where an
innocent owner neither knew of nor consented to the crime." Utah

Voter Guide at 47. The initiative would "protect[] innocent owners"
because "the government - not you - would be required to prove that
your property is subject to forfeiture" Id. at 49.
Initiative B would "make[] the government accountable and
create[] uniform procedures to treat people fairly and equally." Id. at
49 "Arguments For." This was important because there was "no
legislative oversight of the forfeiture process." Id.
These protections were especially important to voters because
of accounts of forfeiture abuse perpetrated against residents of Utah
and other states. See, e.g., Jeff Wright, Op-Ed, Initiative B protects our

liberties, Deseret News, Nov. 1, 2000, ("Rep. Henry Hyde, R-111.,
stated during hearings [last year], 'Unfortunately, I think I can say
that our civil asset seizure laws are being used in terribly unjust ways
and are depriving innocent citizens of their property with nothing
that can be called due process. This is wrong and it must be

GB!
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changed."') 13; Jennifer Dobner, Change in law would protect innocent

from assetforteiture [sic], Deseret News, Sept. 24, 2000 ("In one Juab
County case, a 19-year-old man lost almost all of a $50,000 trust
fund and his new pickup truck because a Utah Highway Patrol
trooper found drug paraphernalia on a passenger in the truck."); 14
Judy Fahys, Activists, Police at Odds on Property Seizure Initiative, S.L.
Trib., Aug 14, 2000, at Bl ("Wilson remembers leaving the local FBI
office seven years ago, head in a spin, after the agency refused to
release his white Porsche convertible from impoundment because of
a federal fraud indictment that had, as it turned out, snared an
acquaintance who had been test-driving the rare sportster. Wilson
never was convicted of a crime. Nor was he charged with one. Still, it
<i,

cost him roughly $20,000 and 18 months -- car payments, insurance
and impoundment fees included -- to get back his car."); id. ("A
Connecticut couple lost their home after drugs were found in a
grandson's room;" "a Florida auto supplier nearly lost his family
business after a drug task force, convinced it was receiving drug
money, seized the company's checking account after a Colombian
customer had used a money exchanger to deposit $2,500 into the
account;'' and "[a] woman wound up losing her car after a speeding
13

Available at
https ://www .deseretnews.com/article/7909 55/Initiative-B-protectsour-liberties.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
14 Available at
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/784470/Change-in-lawwould-protect-innocent-from-asset-forteiture.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2017).
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stop in Louisiana. Police, who had arrested and strip-searched her,
justified seizing her Lincoln Town Car by saying they suspected she
was hiding drugs in a 2 1/2-inch- deep compartment built into that
model."); David Callahan, Editorial, Forfeiture Victim Speaks, S.L.
Trib., Nov. 5, 2000, at AA3 (author describing his personal
experience where an officer seized the author's truck and held it over
fourteen months despite testifying that the truck was not used or
alleged to have been used in any crime).
The general consensus of these many editorials and articles
supporting the Initiative was that "Every Utahn who believes she or
he has the right to the fruits of their labor and effort, who believes
that the state exists to serve the people rather than the people to
serve the state, and who believes the liberties enshrined in the
federal Constitution are worthwhile and deserve continued
nourishment, should vote yes on Initiative Bon Tuesday." The Salt
Lake Tribune, Editorial, Yes on Initiative B, S.L. Trib., Nov 4, 2000, at
A14.
Voters also intended Initiative B to "ensure[] the integrity of
law enforcement" by removing police's "incentive to abuse to
forfeiture." Utah Voter Guide at 49. In other words, it would stop
"policing for profit." Id. at 50 "Rebuttal to." Voters were given specific
examples explaining how the incentive to police for profit was real.
For example, forfeitures had increased 700% between 1998 and
1999 alone. Id. at 49 "Arguments For." "Reform of asset forfeiture
17
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~

[was] badly needed" to "take[] away the financial incentives that
encourage the all too human propensity toward corruption and
abuse." The Salt Lake Tribune, Editorial, Yes on Initiative B, S.L. Trib.,
Nov 4, 2000, at Al 4. The initiative did so by directing forfeiture
revenues to courts, victims, and schools. Utah Voter's Guide at 49
"Arguments For;" id. at 47 (the law would "require distribution of
forfeiture proceeds, after deductions for court costs and victim losses,
to schools instead of counties or the state").
Finally, in passing Initiative B voters intended for Utahns to
reap the benefit of these new procedural protections, not for state
agents to do an end run around them by participating in federal
equitable sharing. To achieve this end, the Initiative created "uniform
procedures to protect property owners where forfeiture is sought by
the government." Utah Voter Guide at 47. Under these procedures,
forfeitures by state agents were to be generally confined to state
court. In state court property would receive protections not available
in federal court and state agencies would not be allowed to directly
profit from the forfeitures they obtained. Additionally, there would
be a high bar for transfer to federal court which could be met only by
a showing that the forfeiture was interstate in nature and sufficiently
complex, that the property could only be forfeited under federal law,
or that state forfeiture proceedings would unduly burden state
prosecutors or law enforcement. Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-114.
In sum, "Initiative B would make government accountable and
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establish legislative oversight for the first time."' Id. at 50 "Rebuttal
to."

2.2

The 2004 Amendments to Forfeiture and
Disputation of Property Act Strengthened, not
Weakened, the Protections Offered by Initiative B

After losing the public battle against Initiative B, law
enforcement agencies fought the new law in court. Ultimately, they
lost the court battle, Kennard v. Leavitt, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D.
Utah 2002), but some agencies continued to openly flaunt the law.
A January, 2003, state auditor report found "that law
enforcement agencies [in Weber, Salt Lake, and Davis] counties kept
more than $237,000 in forfeited revenue for law enforcement rather
than depositing the funds in the education account." Scott G. Bullock,

Ending "Policing for Profit": IJ Represents Utah Citizens Fighting
Forfeiture Abuse, 12:4 Law and Liberty Newsletter (Inst. for Justice),
August 2003. 15 Only after facing lawsuit did the counties back down
and surrender the misappropriated funds. Scott G. Bullock, IJ Helps

End Utah's Prosecution for Profit, 12:5 Law and Liberty Newsletter
(Inst. for Justice), October 2003. 16
Ultimately, law enforcement turned to the State Legislature to
reverse the will of the voters. In response, the Legislature passed S.B.
175. The purpose of the bill was to "increase[] innocent owner
15

Available at http://ij.org/ll/august-2003-volume-12-number4/ending-policing-for-profit-ij-represents-utah-citizens-fightingforfeiture-abuse/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
16 Available at http://ij.org/ll/october-2003-volume-12-number-5/ijhelps-end-utahs-prosecution-for-profit/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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protections" and "repeal[] the provision for depositing forfeiture
proceeds in the Uniform School Fund" and "create[] a restricted
account for specified state forfeiture funds, and provide[] that funds
in the account shall be appropriated to the Commission on Criminal
and Juvenile Justice." S.B. 175, 2004 General Session (enacted). 17 In
other words, Initiative B's protections were left intact, even
strengthened, by the changes. And although S.B. 175 allowed police
to access forfeited funds, they cannot do so directly but must request
it from a restricted account. As the bill's sponsor put it, "[t]he goal of
the bill [was] to maintain and strengthen the property rights as
instituted by Initiative B ... We want to maintain and even strengthen
those property rights .... " Rep. Stephen Urquhart, S.B. 175, Utah
House Floor Debate, March 2, 2004.
The pertinent fact about these amendments is not that they
were undertaken at the behest of law enforcement, but rather that
despite law enforcement opposition to Initiative B the Legislature
intended to "maintain and strengthen the property rights as
instituted by Initiative B" even while permitting limited law
enforcement use of these assets with oversight.
3. Title 24 of the Utah Code Confers on the State Courts In
Rem Jurisdiction Over Assets Seized for Forfeitures.
~

Authority for state agents to seize property is statutorily
controlled. See Utah Code Ann. § 24-2-102 "Grounds for seizing

17

Available at https://le.utah.gov/-2004/bills/static/SB0l 75.html

(last visited Oct. 9, 2017).
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

property." Property may be seized pursuant to a warrant. Id. at§ 242-102(1). Or it may be seized without a warrant (a) incident to
arrest; (b) when the property is subject to a court injunction or
forfeiture order; or (c) when the property is dangerous to health,
evidence of a crime, the instrument of a crime, or the proceeds of a
crime. Id. at § 24-2-102(2).
The parties agree that property seized pursuant to a state court
warrant is subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the state courts. They
disagree over the jurisdictional status of property seized without a
warrant.
The current version of the statute directly describes jurisdiction
once: "A state district court has jurisdiction over any action filed in
accordance with this title." Id. at§ 24-1-103(1). At first glance, this
passage seems to indicate that state district courts have jurisdiction
only after forfeiture action is filed in court. But if that were the case,
Appellee UHP would likewise be wrong in conceding that a courtordered warrant grants jurisdiction because a warrant is not an
"action" any more than an arrest warrant is criminal indictment or
information. In other words, Appellant's concession that limiting
jurisdiction to after a forfeiture action is filed is too restrictive.
Furthermore, the fact that the district court has jurisdiction over "any
filed action" says nothing about which court has jurisdiction between
seizure and the time an action is filed.
The key to understanding§ 24-1-103(1), and reconciling the
21
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entirety of Title 24, is two-fold. First, § 24-1-103(1) applies to
situations where a forfeiture action was commenced against a nonseized property or a property originally seized for evidentiary or
investigative purposes, but does not control jurisdiction for seized
assets. Second, this section does not refer to in rem jurisdiction at all.
The rest of the section states that jurisdiction granted the district
court is "regarding: (a) all interests in property if the property is
within this state at the time the action is filed; and (b) a claimant's
interests in the property, if the claimant is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the district court." Id. In other words, the section is
granting state courts subject matter jurisdiction over interests in the
property, not in rem jurisdiction over the property itself.
Given the absence of language explicitly discussing in rem
jurisdiction, we must look to the entirety of Title 24's text to
understand in rem jurisdiction under the act. And reading the
entirety of the act shows that jurisdiction is gained over property
seized for forfeiture at the moment of seizure. This can be inferred
most readily from two provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-108 and §
24-4-114.
3.1
~

Utah Code Ann. §24-4-108(4) Directly Confers In
Rem Jurisdiction to State Courts over Property
Seized for Forfeiture

In a direct grant of jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-108 (4)
states that "Property held for forfeiture is considered to be in the
custody of the district court." Although this passage is often
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overlooked because it seems to speak in terms of custody and not
jurisdiction, it was reasonable language for drafters to use to grant
State courts in rem jurisdiction over seized assets. This is because
state and federal courts in the early 2000s would have understood
the phrase as a legal term of art imbuing state courts with in rem
jurisdiction at the moment a state agent seizes property under the
color of state law.

~

For example, in United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 1236, n2. (9th
Cir. 2005) (Ferguson, C.J., concurring specially), the court noted
that: "The Fifth Circuit has held that, where a state statute places
items seized by local law enforcement under judicial control, seizure
by state police itself constitutes an assertion of in rem jurisdiction
over the seized item." (citing Scarabin v. DEA, 966 F.2d 989, 993-94
(5th Cir. 1992)).
In In re$ 490,920 in United States Currency, 911 F. Supp. 720,
725 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a New York State court found that a New York
statute conferred in rem jurisdiction where it provided that seized
items be held "in the custody of the court."
And in Commonwealth v. Rufo, 429 Mass. 380, 708 N.E.2d 947,
949 (Mass. 1999) the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a
Massachusetts statute conferred in rem jurisdiction where it provided
that seized evidence be held "under the direction of the court" and
"disposed of as the court or justice orders." (citing Massachusetts
General Laws Annotated 276, Section 3).
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These cases show that language granting a court control over
seized property is a grant of in rem jurisdiction. There is no magical
incantation required, just common-sense language giving the court
control over the property. Such language exists in Utah's statute:
assets seized for forfeiture are "in the custody of the district court."
Thus, the explicit language of Utah's statute places items seized by a
state agent for forfeiture into the in rem jurisdiction of the state
courts.
3.2

Utah Code Ann. §24-4-114 Strongly Implies that State
Courts Are Imbued with In Rem Jurisdiction and the
Moment of Seizure

Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-114 provides additional evidence that
state courts have in rem jurisdiction at the time of seizure.
The section places certain restrictions on agencies that have
seized property and held it for forfeiture:
Seizing agencies or prosecuting attorneys authorized to
bring forfeiture proceedings under this chapter may not
directly or indirectly transfer property held for forfeiture
and not already named in a criminal indictment to any
federal agency or any governmental entity not created
under and subject to state law unless the court enters an
order, upon petition of the prosecuting attorney,
authorizing the property to be transferred.
Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-114(1) (a). This subsection is clearly designed
to prevent state agencies from side-stepping state protections through
the use of federal equitable sharing. Unless the seized property is
already named in a federal indictment, the property cannot be
~

transferred without a petition and court authorization. This assumes
that state courts have jurisdiction over forfeited assets at the moment
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of seizure. If the property were not in the jurisdiction of the court,
there would be no basis to require a court order before the transfer.
A major flaw with the State's argument is that it places seized
property into a temporary jurisdictional limbo. Seized propertymuch like Schrodinger's cat -would not be subject to any identifiable
due process until someone takes some court action. In other words,
just like opening the box determines whether the cat is alive or dead,
it is the filing of an action in court that crystalizes which procedural
due process property will receive. But this is problematic because an
essential tenet of constitutional law is that property must be seized
pursuant to due process. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. N; U.S. Const.

amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XN, § 1; Utah Const. art. I, § 7; Utah
Const. art. I,§ 14. Seizing property without a known, identifiable
process is the exact sort of state action Initiative B was meant to
prevent.
4. Practical Consequences
4.1

Holding that the Notice of Intent of Forfeiture Does
Not Imbue State Courts with in rem Jurisdiction
Would Work a Manifest Injustice on a Property
Owners Legitimate Due Process Expectations.

Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-103 requires a seizing agency to serve a
notice of intent to seek forfeiture on known claimants. The notice
"shall describe the: (i) date of the seizure; (ii) property seized; (iii)
claimant's rights and obligations under this chapter, including the
availability of hardship relief in appropriate circumstances; and (iv)
statutory basis for the forfeiture, including the judicial proceedings
25
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by which property may be forfeited under this chapter." Id. at§ 24-4103(1) (b). In other words, property owners are specifically notified
of their rights, obligations, and judicial remedies under state law.
UHP's position that the notice does not put jurisdiction with state
courts would allow the expectations created by that notice to be
frustrated. A property owner told by a state agent that a specific
course of proceedings would govern the forfeiture could suddenly be
surprised by another agency swooping in at the last moment and
imposing a wholly different set of forfeiture proceedings without
~

going through the expected transfer proceedings. Frustrating the
justified due-process-expectations of the property owner would work
a manifest injustice on the property owner.

~

4.2

Initiative B Was to End Policing for Profit; Ruling for
UHP Allows It to Continue Unchecked

Initiative B took great pains to end policing for profit.
Originally, the measure prevented law enforcement from using any
part of forfeited assets by directing all proceeds to the Unified School
Fund. Utah Voter Guide at 48. The 2004 amendments allowed police
to once again use forfeited assets, but subject to severe restrictions:
proceeds would be deposited into a restricted account, Utah Code
Ann. § 24-4-116, and only obtainable indirectly through a State Asset
{jjJ

Forfeiture Grant program, see id. at § 24-4-117. The grant program
allows agencies to apply for forfeited assets, requires agencies to
demonstrate need and ability to appropriately use the funds, declares
permissible and impermissible uses of the funds, and necessitates
26
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permission of the applying agency's governing legislative body. Id at
§ 24-4-117. By disallowing the direct assumption and use of forfeited

assets, as well as placing restrictions and oversight on their use, Utah
law minimizes the incentive for law enforcement to initiate forfeiture
for profit motives.
Federal law, however, does not contain these restrictions. And
the equitable sharing program permits agencies to obtain direct
access to 80% of the proceeds of the forfeited assets. John Worrall,
Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Response Guide Series No. 7:
Asset Forfeiture 8 (2008). 18 Under UHP's vision of the statute, state
agencies can seize property under state law, ignore state law
protections by turning the seizure over to the federal government
without a court ordered transfer, and then receive the proceeds back
with no strings attached, cleansed by federal forfeiture proceedings.
At best this resembles forum shopping and, at worst, money
laundering. This is exactly the result that Title 24 was intended to
prevent. If state courts are not granted jurisdiction at the moment of
seizure, state agencies can effectively nullify all the protections put in
place by Initiative B and its amendments.
Conclusion

Federal Civil Asset Forfeiture has become a juggernaut that
arguably exceeds constitutional boundaries. In response to abuses
18

Available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=682384 (last
visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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and overreach, numerous states, including Utah, enacted reforms to
tame the beast. In Utah, voters did so with specific intent to curtail
the twin problems of policing for profit and weak due process in the
federal regime. Under Title 24 of the state code, police are required
to give owners of seized assets notice of their rights, obligations, and
recourses under state law. Furthermore, the law gives custody of
assets seized for forfeiture to the state district courts and then directs
that those assets are only subject to the orders of the state court and
may only be transferred to the federal system under a limited set of
circumstances.
Perhaps what makes the objectionable forms of civil asset
forfeiture so viscerally repulsive is that they fly in the face of the rule
of law itself. Without a predetermined set of rules governing who
can take property, under what circumstances, and with what
oversight, seizures can become arbitrary. To the property owner it
feels like governmentally sanctioned theft. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman,
Taken, The New Yorker, Aug 12 & 19, 2013; 19 Conor Friedersdorf,
Jeff Sessions Treads on the Property Rights of Americans, The
Atlantic, Jul. 19, 2017 (referring to asset forfeiture as "highway
robbery perpetrated against American citizens by their own
government"). 20 Title 24 is a valiant effort to set out a complete set of
19 Available

at

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/08/12/taken (last
visited Oct. 4, 2014).
20

Available at
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procedures delineating the permissible boundaries of asset forfeiture
in Utah. While certain passages, particularly those respecting the
various forms of jurisdiction, could have been drafted more explicitly,
reading the Act as a whole makes it clear that the intent and purpose
was to have state agents act under state law with state protections
administered by state courts. Regardless of whether it is because the
seizure gives state courts in rem jurisdiction or because the issuance
of a notice of intent by a state agent gives state court in rem
jurisdiction, the outcome is that state courts have in rem jurisdiction.
Allowing state agencies acting under the color of state law to
seize property and then opt-out of state restrictions at their discretion
makes a mockery of the rule of law and the procedures laid out by
Title 24. It makes state agents a law unto themselves.

treads-on-the-property-rights-of-americans/533979/ (last visited Oct.
9, 2017).
29
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ijl/

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
The Libertas Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant was
sent via e-mail to the following
Ann Marie Taliaferro
ann@brownbradshaw.com
James Bradshaw
jim@brownbradshaw.com
Counsel for Appellant
Stanford Purser
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellees
spurser@agutah.gov

DATED October 9, 2017.
/s/ Adam Pomeroy
ADAM R. POMEROY

~

30
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Certificate of Compliance with Type-Volume Limitation, Typeface
Requirements, and Type-Style Requirements:
~

This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App.
P.24(f)(l) because:
this brief contains 6,911 words, excluding the parts of the brief
exempted by Utah R. App. P.24(f)(l)(B).

This brief complies with the typeface and type-style requirements of
Utah R. App. P.27(b) because:
this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2016 in Charter in a 13-point
size.

DATED October 9, 2017.
/s/ Adam Pomeroy
ADAM R. POMEROY

~

31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Addenda
~

32
~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gtil

Addendum A

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Qp

Utah Code§ 24-1-103
24-1-103. Jurisdiction and venue.
(1)

A state district court has jurisdiction over any action filed in

accordance with this title regarding:
(a)

all interests in property if the property is within this

state at the time the action is filed; and
(b)

a claimant's interests in the property, if the claimant is

subject to the personal jurisdiction of the district court.
(2)

(a)

In addition to the venue provided for under Title 78B,

Chapter 3, Part 3, Place of Trial -- Venue, or any other
provisions of law, a proceeding for forfeiture under this title
may be maintained in the judicial district in which:
(i)

any part of the property is found; or

(ii)

a civil or criminal action could be maintained

against a claimant for the conduct alleged to constitute
grounds for forfeiture.
(b)

A claimant may obtain a change of venue under Section

78B-3-309.

Available at https ://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/ Chapterl/24-1-

S103 .html

~
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Utah Code Ann. § 24-2-102

24-2-102. Grounds for seizing property.
(1)

Property may be seized by a peace officer or any other person

authorized by law upon process issued by a court having jurisdiction
over the property in accordance with the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure relating to search warrants or administrative warrants.
(2)

Property may be seized under this chapter when:
(a)

the seizure is incident to an arrest;

(b)

the property seized is the subject of a prior judgment in

favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture
proceeding under this title; or
(c)

the peace officer or other person authorized by law has

probable cause to believe that the property:
(i)

is directly or indirectly dangerous to health or

safety;
(ii)

is evidence of a crime;

(iii)

has been used or was intended to be used to

commit a crime; or
(iv)

is proceeds of a crime.

Available at https://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter2/24-2-

S102.html
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Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-103

24-4-103. Initiating forfeiture proceedings -- Notice of intent to
seek forfeiture.
(1)

(a)

Within 30 days from the date that property is seized, an

agency seeking to forfeit property shall serve a notice of intent
to seek forfeiture upon any claimants known to the agency.
(b)

The notice of intent to seek forfeiture shall describe the:
(i)

date of the seizure;

(ii)

property seized;

(iii)

claimant's rights and obligations under this

chapter, including the availability of hardship relief in
appropriate circumstances; and
(iv)

statutory basis for the forfeiture, including the

judicial proceedings by which property may be forfeited
under this chapter.

(@

(c)

The notice of intent to seek forfeiture shall be served by:
(i)

certified mail, return receipt requested, to the

claimant's known address; or
(ii)
(d)

personal service.

The court may void any forfeiture made without notice

under Subsection (l)(a), unless the agency demonstrates:
(i)

good cause for the failure to give notice to the

claimant; or
(ii)

that the claimant had actual notice of the seizure.
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~

(2)

(a)

Once the agency has served each claimant with a notice

of intent to seek forfeiture, but no later than 60 days from the
date that property is seized, the agency shall present a written
~

request for forfeiture to the prosecuting attorney.
(b)

The written request shall:
(i)

describe the property to be forfeited; and

(ii)

include a copy of all reports, supporting

documents, and other evidence necessary for the
prosecuting attorney to determine the legal sufficiency
for filing a forfeiture action.

Available at https://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter4/24-4S103.html
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Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-108
24-4-108. Release of property held for forfeiture on certain
grounds.
(1)

After the seizing agency gives notice that the property is to be

held for forfeiture, a person or entity may not alienate, convey,
sequester, or attach that property until the court issues a final order
of dismissal or an order of forfeiture regarding the property.
(2)

The seizing agency or the prosecuting attorney may authorize

the release of property held for forfeiture to a claimant if retention of
actual custody is unnecessary.
(3)

With the consent of a court of competent jurisdiction, the

prosecuting attorney may discontinue forfeiture proceedings and
transfer the action to another state or federal agency that has
initiated forfeiture proceedings involving the same property.
(4)

Property held for forfeiture is considered to be in the custody

of the district court and subject only to:
(a)

the orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction

over the property or the forfeiture proceedings; and
(b)

the acts of the agency that possesses the property or the

prosecuting attorney pursuant to this chapter.
(5)

(a)

A claimant may obtain release of property held for

forfeiture by posting with the district court a surety bond or
cash in an amount equal to the current fair market value of the
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property as determined by the court or by the parties'
stipulation.
(b)

The district court may refuse to order the release of the

property if:
(i)

the bond tendered is inadequate;

(ii)

the property is contraband or is retained as

evidence; or
(iii)

the property is particularly altered or designed for

use in conduct giving cause for forfeiture.

If a surety bond or cash is posted and the court later

(c)

determines that the property is subject to forfeiture, the court
shall order the forfeiture of the surety bond or cash in lieu of
the property.
(6)

A claimant is entitled to the immediate release of property held

for forfeiture pending the final determination of forfeiture if:
(a)

the claimant had a possessory interest in the property at

~

the time of seizure;
(b)

continued possession by the agency or the state pending

the final disposition of the forfeiture proceedings will cause
substantial hardship to the claimant, such as:
(i)

preventing the functioning of a legitimate

~

business;
(ii)

preventing any individual from working;
~
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(iii)

preventing any child from attending elementary or

secondary school;
(iv)

preventing or hindering any person from receiving

necessary medical care;
(v)

hindering the care of an elderly or disabled

dependent child or adult;
(vi)

leaving any individual homeless; or

(vii) any other condition that the court determines
causes a substantial hardship;
(c)

the hardship from the continued possession of the

property by the agency outweighs the risk that the property
will be destroyed, damaged, lost, concealed, or transferred if it
is returned to the claimant during the pendency of the
proceeding; and
(d)

determination of substantial hardship under this

Subsection (6) is based upon the property's use prior to the
seizure.
(7)

After the seizing agency gives notice that the property is to be

held for forfeiture, a claimant may file a motion for hardship release:
(a)

in the court in which forfeiture proceedings have

commenced; or
(b)

in any district court having jurisdiction over the

property, if forfeiture proceedings have not yet commenced.

(J
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(8)

The motion for hardship release shall also be served upon the

prosecuting attorney or the seizing agency within 10 days after filing
the motion.
(9)

The court shall render a decision on a motion for hardship filed

under this section not later than 20 days after the date of filing, or 10
days after service upon the prosecuting attorney or seizing agency,
whichever is earlier, unless this period is extended by the agreement
of both parties or by the court for good cause shown.
(10)
(a)

If the claimant demonstrates substantial hardship

~

pursuant to this section, the court shall order the property
immediately released to the claimant pending completion of
proceedings by the government to obtain forfeiture of the
property.
(b)

The court may place conditions on release of the

property as it finds necessary and appropriate to preserve the

~

availability of the property or its equivalent for forfeiture.
(11) The hardship release under this section does not apply to:
(a)

contraband;

(b)

currency or other monetary instrument or electronic

funds; or
(c)

~

property that is likely to be used to commit additional

illegal acts if returned to the claimant.
~
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(12)

(a)

The court may order property that is held for forfeiture

to be sold, as allowed by Subsection (13), leased, rented, or
operated to satisfy a specified interest of any claimant, or to
preserve the interests of any party on motion of that party.
(b)

The court may enter orders under Subsection (12) (a)

after written notice to persons known to have an interest in the
property, and after an opportunity for a hearing.
(13)

(a)

A sale may be ordered under Subsection (12) when the

property is liable to perish, waste, or be significantly reduced
in value, or when the expenses of maintaining the property are
disproportionate to its value.
(b)

A third party designated by the court shall dispose of the

property by commercially reasonable public sale and distribute
the proceeds in the following order of priority:
(i)

first, for the payment of reasonable expenses

incurred in connection with the sale;
(ii)

second, for the satisfaction of any interests,

including those of interest holders, in the order of their
priority as determined by Title 70A, Uniform
Commercial Code; and
(iii)

third, any balance of the proceeds shall be

preserved in the actual or constructive custody of the
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court, in an interest-bearing account, subject to further
proceedings under this chapter.

Available at https ://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter4/24-4S108.html
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Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-114
24-4-114. Transfer and sharing procedures.
(1)
(a)

Seizing agencies or prosecuting attorneys authorized to

bring forfeiture proceedings under this chapter may not
directly or indirectly transfer property held for forfeiture and
not already named in a criminal indictment to any federal
agency or any governmental entity not created under and
subject to state law unless the court enters an order, upon
petition of the prosecuting attorney, authorizing the property
to be transferred.
(b)

The court may not enter an order authorizing a transfer

under Subsection (1) (a) unless:
(i)

the conduct giving rise to the investigation or

seizure is interstate in nature and sufficiently complex to
justify the transfer;
(ii)

the property may only be forfeited under federal

law; or
(iii)

pursuing forfeiture under state law would

unreasonably burden prosecuting attorneys or state law
enforcement agencies.
(c)

A petition to transfer property to a federal agency under

this section shall include:
(i)

a detailed description of the property seized;
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(ii)

the location where the property was seized;

(iii)

the date the property was seized;

(iv)

the case number assigned by the seizing law

enforcement agency; and
(v)

a declaration that:
(A)

states the basis for relinquishing jurisdiction

to a federal agency;
(B)

contains the names and addresses of any

claimants then known; and
(C)
(d)

is signed by the prosecutor.

The court may not authorize the transfer of property to

the federal government if the transfer would circumvent the
protections of the Utah Constitution or of this chapter that
would otherwise be available to the property owner.
(e)
(i)

Prior to granting any order to transfer pursuant to

this section, the court shall give any claimant the right to
be heard with regard to the transfer by the mailing of a
notice to each address contained in the declaration.
(ii)

If no claimant objects to the petition to transfer

property within 10 days of the mailing of the notice, the
court shall issue its order under this section.
(iii)

If the declaration does not include an address for

a claimant, the court shall delay its order under this
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section for 20 days to allow time for the claimant to
appear and make an objection.
(f)
(i)
~

If a claimant contests a petition to transfer

property to a federal agency, the court shall promptly set
the matter for hearing.
(ii)

(A)

The court shall determine whether the state

may relinquish jurisdiction by a standard of
preponderance of the evidence.
(B)

In making the determination, the court shall

consider evidence regarding hardship, complexity,
judicial and law enforcement resources, and any
other matter the court determines to be relevant.
(2)

All property, money, or other things of value received by an

agency pursuant to federal law, which authorizes the sharing or
transfer of all or a portion of forfeited property or the proceeds of the
sale of forfeited property to an agency:
(a)

shall be used in compliance with federal laws and

regulations relating to equitable sharing;
(b)

may be used for those law enforcement purposes

specified in Subsection 24-4-117 (9); and
(c)

may not be used for those law enforcement purposes

prohibited in Subsection 24-4-117 (10).
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(3)

A state or local law enforcement agency awarded any equitable

share of property forfeited by the federal government may only use
the award money after approval of the use by the agency's legislative
body.

Available at https://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter4/24-4-

S114.html

~
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Utah Code Ann.§ 24-4-116
24-4-116. Criminal Forfeiture Restricted Account.

(1)

There is created within the General Fund a restricted account

known as the "Criminal Forfeiture Restricted Account."
(2)

Proceeds from forfeited property and forfeited money through

state forfeitures shall be deposited into the account.
(3)

Money in the account shall be appropriated to the commission

for implementing the program under Section 24-4-117.

Available at https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter4/24-4-

S116.html
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Utah Code Ann. § 24-4-117
24-4-114. Transfer and sharing procedures.
(1)

(a)

Seizing agencies or prosecuting attorneys authorized to

bring forfeiture proceedings under this chapter may not
directly or indirectly transfer property held for forfeiture and
not already named in a criminal indictment to any federal
agency or any governmental entity not created under and
subject to state law unless the court enters an order, upon
petition of the prosecuting attorney, authorizing the property
to be transferred.
(b)

The court may not enter an order authorizing a transfer

under Subsection (1) (a) unless:
(i)

the conduct giving rise to the investigation or

seizure is interstate in nature and sufficiently complex to
justify the transfer;
(ii)

the property may only be forfeited under federal

law; or
(iii)

pursuing forfeiture under state law would

unreasonably burden prosecuting attorneys or state law
enforcement agencies.
(c)

A petition to transfer property to a federal agency under

this section shall include:
(i)

a detailed description of the property seized;
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(ii)

the location where the property was seized;

(iii)

the date the property was seized;

(iv)

the case number assigned by the seizing law

enforcement agency; and

@

(v)

a declaration that:
(A)

states the basis for relinquishing jurisdiction

to a federal agency;

<@

(B)

contains the names and addresses of any

claimants then known; and
@

(C)

is signed by the prosecutor.

(d)

The court may not authorize the transfer of

property to the federal government if the transfer
@

would circumvent the protections of the Utah
Constitution or of this chapter that would
otherwise be available to the property owner.

~

(e)
(i)

Prior to granting any order to transfer pursuant to

this section, the court shall give any claimant the right to
be heard with regard to the transfer by the mailing of a
notice to each address contained in the declaration.
(ii)

If no claimant objects to the petition to transfer

property within 10 days of the mailing of the notice, the
court shall issue its order under this section.
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(iii)

If the declaration does not include an address for

a claimant, the court shall delay its order under this
section for 20 days to allow time for the claimant to
appear and make an objection.
(f)

(i)

If a claimant contests a petition to transfer

property to a federal agency, the court shall promptly set
the matter for hearing.
(ii)
(A)

The court shall determine whether the state

may relinquish jurisdiction by a standard of
preponderance of the evidence.
(B)

In making the determination, the court shall

consider evidence regarding hardship, complexity,
judicial and law enforcement resources, and any
other matter the court determines to be relevant.
(2)

All property, money, or other things of value received by an

agency pursuant to federal law, which authorizes the sharing or
transfer of all or a portion of forfeited property or the proceeds of the
sale of forfeited property to an agency:
(a)

shall be used in compliance with federal laws and

regulations relating to equitable sharing;
(b)

may be used for those law enforcement purposes

specified in Subsection 24-4-117(9); and
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(c)
~

may not be used for those law enforcement purposes

prohibited in Subsection 24-4-117 (10).
(3)

A state or local law enforcement agency awarded any equitable

share of property forfeited by the federal government may only use
the award money after approval of the use by the agency's legislative
body.

Available at https://le. utah.gov/xcode/Title24/Chapter4/24-4S117.html

~
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1

I think - and I think going back to the point of

2

which court is asserting jurisdiction first is kind of

3

important and I think that kind of addresses - the two cases

4

the Court wanted me to address, the Scarabin on the Fifth

5

Circuit and the U.S. vs. $506,000 from the Seventh Circuit.

6

THE COURT:

Right.

7

MR. BOLANDER:

And here's the - with my research,

8

this particular situation - there's not a lot of case law.

A

9

situation where the federal, where the DEA obtains a seizure

10

warrant to obtain, to assert jurisdiction over the property

11

when there isn't any forfeiture proceedings initiated in

12

state court.

13

I found was the one I cited, the one that district court case

14

from Missouri, the matter of whatever it was,

15

for the ${inaudible).

16

there's one aspect to the cases that petitioner cited, the

17

Scarabin, especially Scarabin is all those cases where the

18

federal court said we lack jurisdiction because the state

19

court had jurisdiction, and I think almost all of them, one

20

of two things was present, one was there was an actual state

21

forfeiture proceeding as in,

22

forfeiture proceedings in court or -

23

24
25

There's not a lot of case law and the only one

THE COURT:

But these two cases,

seizure warrant

so the Scarabin -

like the state actually filed

Actually that's not - lots of them were

not that actually.
MR. BOLANDER:

The other situation though is where
13
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1

you had a state court issuing a search warrant to obtain the

2

property, and that's what happened in Scarabin.

3

think the language in Scarabin is by virtue of issuing the

4

search warrant that procured the seized funds - and that case

5

- that's why I -

6
7

THE COURT:

In fact I

Actually I think both of those were.

The Ninth Circuit case and the Fifth Circuit case were both -

8

MR. BOLANDER:

9

THE COURT:

10

Yeah,

I think that one -

- search warrants.

MR. BOLANDER:

I believe - let me see here.

I

11

think there are a couple for sure.

12

ones where the state court had issued a search warrant to go

13

obtain the property and I think that's a little bit

14

distinguishable from this case because in that case the state

15

court actually did some sort of action and the action was I'm

16

issuing a seizure warrant, go obtain this property.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BOLANDER:

19

THE COURT:

Those two for sure are

Well, it wasn't a seizure warrant.
Sorry, seizure - search warrant.

It was a search warrant and pursuant to

20

the search they found, you know, the proceeds that they then

21

seized.

22

MR. BOLANDER:

Right, and I think that's

23

distinguishable from this case because in this case there was

24

no action by this Court until its ruling last month in

25

February when the petitioner filed the petition to release

14
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1

the property.

2

nothing that happened in this Court like the - and I think

3

this goes also to the question of the state when they seized,

4

when the trooper seized it they provided the petitioner with

5

the intent to seize form.

6

I think that's the big distinction is there's

The problem with the intent to seize form is that

7

in itself doesn't actually initiate the actual forfeiture

8

proceeding.

9

within 75 days after the seizure.

That happens later, has to happen, you know,
But the importance of the

10

intent is that's sort of the prerequisite in order to

11

initiate the forfeiture proceedings in state court.

12

that then the court may dismiss it,

13

exceptions that they can't.

14

prerequisite but that in itself doesn't actually start the

15

actual proceeding to do that.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BOLANDER:

Without

I think there's like two

But basically, that the

Right.
And so I think that's the difference

18

is nothing happened in this court until this Court ruled on

19

the petitioner's motion to return the property.

20

that's distinguishable from cases where the state court

21

initially issued the search warrant in the first place where

22

it did some sort of affirmative act - you know, some sort of

23

an action or order, something you can point to that says this

24

Court exercised jurisdiction.

25

there was no exercise of jurisdiction, and that's why I think

I think

I suppose in this case where

15
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1

Judge Benson's opinion in Kennard vs. Leavitt makes a lot of

2

sense for this case.

3

goes back to the simple criteria which is the court defers to

4

assert jurisdiction, you know, actually do something to

5

assert jurisdiction over the property, has jurisdiction and I

6

think that,

7

of reconcile the concurrent jurisdictions, is which Court

8

were - actually did something in this case -

9

It goes back to the simple question,

it

I think Judge Benson's logic is the way to kind

THE COURT:

Well,

so did something but the Court is

10

not doing anything when the state decides to file the

11

petition, right?

12

actually filed a forfeiture petition, then the court would

13

have done something?

You're saying that if the state had

14

MR. BOLANDER:

15

THE COURT:

Prior -

It's not actually a court doing

16

anything, it's the state, right?

17

MR. BOLANDER:

I should clarify,

it should be

18

either the court does something as in a search warrant or

19

some sort of order or there's something actually initiated in

20

the court such as filing the petition, you know, filing a

21

petition for forfeiture.

22

case before the federal court issued its seizure warrant then

23

I would,

24

jurisdiction.

25

court issued its seizure warrant first,

Again, had that happened in this

I would be of the opinion that this court would have
But since that didn't happen and the federal
that conferred -

16
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1

because there was no filing in state court or any sort of

2

search warrant that sort of asserted jurisdiction over the

3

property, at that point the federal court was the first one

4

to obtain jurisdiction.

5

of DPS kind of being in between two courts ordering

6

jurisdiction, which one, you know, did something or which one

7

- or which court actually has a proceeding before it to

8

consider that would confer jurisdiction.
THE COURT:

9

And by that,

it resolves this issue

And -

So your view is that if the court had

10

issued,

11

you know, the trooper wanted to conduct a search of the

12

vehicle and didn't feel like he could do it without applying

13

for a search warrant and the state issued a search warrant

14

then he searched the vehicle pursuant to that search warrant,

15

the state would have in rem jurisdiction then?

16

if the state court had issued a search warrant,

MR. BOLANDER:

say,

I think so because at that point

17

what you have is an order from this court saying search the

18

vehicle, you're looking,

19

think that would have conferred jurisdiction to this court.

20

But again, this was a warrantless search, he had probable

21

cause to think,

22

what happened.

you know,

for whatever you're looking for.

I

to search the vehicle and that's

So what I'm saying is this particular case, we're

23
24

asking for,

25

grounds.

our motion to set aside is based on really narrow

I want to be clear.

We're not asking for an order

17
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1

that says the state, you know, DPS is free to, you know,

2

ignore state law when it doesn't want to comply.

3

saying these, this is kind of an unusual situation where a

4

federal court has come in -

5

least for the last year or two, these cases are almost always

6

resolved,

7

court.

8

circumstances where a federal court has come in with a

9

seizure warrant.

We're

'cause typically these cases, at

I think the vast majority are - stay in state

This is one of the few where a federal,

few limited

The fact that there wasn't any search

10

warrant from this court, there wasn't any proceedings

11

initiated prior to the seizure warrant,

12

think,

13

logic that that confers jurisdiction to the federal court.

14

And even - and with jurisdiction to the federal court,

15

keep in mind too,

16

process rights in federal court.

17

contest the seizure warrant which, you know,

18

filings he's pretty much ready to do and even then if the

19

federal,

20

Attorney's Office that would do the forfeiture,

21

forfeiture,

22

to contest the lawfulness of the forfeiture.

23

I think that,

I

I believe and I'm going along with Judge Benson's

I mean

the petitioner still has his full due

if the DEA - or sorry,

he still has a full,

I mean he can certainly
based on his

I guess it's the U.S.
initiate

a second bite at the apple

So at this point, you know, we believe the federal

24

court asserted jurisdiction with its seizure warrant and to

25

resolve this conflict of who has jurisdiction, they first
18
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1

asserted jurisdiction and the Court should set aside and let

2

it play out in federal court.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

So the language of, and you may

4

have addressed this, but can you address it again if you

5

have, the language of the statute that says property held for

6

forfeiture is considered to be in the custody of the district

7

court and subject only to the orders and decrees of the court

8

having jurisdiction over the property.

9

MR. BOLANDER:

How do you - so ...

Two ways to read that.

One is the

10

court having jurisdiction, in this case I'd argue it's the

11

federal court the one having jurisdiction and -

12
13

14

THE COURT:

But if the property is in the custody

of the district court?
MR. BOLANDER:

Address that.
Well, that's the problem.

If you

15

read it, again,

16

was asking at the very beginning when I started talking was

17

the conflict, the conflict is with that reading a federal

18

court could never exercise jurisdiction unless basically it

19

was one of its own, unless it was a federal officer seizing

20

under federal law.

21

conflict in situations like this where the federal court or

22

the DEA and U.S. Attorney's Office obviously has an interest

23

in this case and by simply saying by operation of law,

24

federal courts always have, we'll have to always get a

25

turnover order.

if -

I think it goes back to what the Court

I think that,

I think that creates a

I think that essentially preempts any sort
19
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